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I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning with New Jersey in December 2010, more than a
dozen states modified their statutes governing collective
representation of public employees. The most visible nationally were
Wisconsin, where the bill pushed by Governor Scott Walker and
ultimately enacted produced the largest demonstrations in Madison
since the Vietnam War and led to the recall of two Republican state
1
senators and an effort to recall the governor, and Ohio, where the
enactment that radically changed the state’s public employee
collective bargaining statute was overwhelmingly rejected in a voter
2
referendum. Receiving less national attention were changes in
numerous other states that ranged from relatively minor tweaks to
radical overhauls and outright repeal of collective bargaining rights.
* Professor and Director, Institute for Law and the Workplace, IIT Chicago-Kent
College of Law. I gratefully acknowledge excellent research assistance from Amanda Clark,
Chicago-Kent class of 2012, and financial support from the Marshall-Ewell Research Fund at
Chicago-Kent.
1. Scott Bauer, Union Anger Reflected in Lobbyist Report: The Four Groups That Spent
the Most in the First Half of 2011 Opposed Gov. Walker’s Agenda, WIS. STATE J., Sept. 16, 2011,
at A3.
2. Editorial, Humble Pie, 32 CRAIN’S CLEV. BUS., Nov. 14, 2011, at 10.
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Fueling this tsunami of legislative reform was the view that
3
public employee collective bargaining is bad for the public. Under
this view, unions exercising outsized power have been able to use a
privileged position of exclusive access to decision makers to extract
excessive wages and benefits, protect employees who are mediocre or
worse performers, stifle incentives to excel, and stifle innovation.
Joseph Slater’s path-breaking work on the history of public
sector collective bargaining has shown how the law has channeled
public sector unions, often not for the better. For example, he has
shown how courts through the early 1960s, in upholding public
employer prohibitions of union membership, ignored union
structures, bylaws, and intended purposes, and instead attributed to
them all of the attributes of private sector unions, seeking to engage
in traditional collective bargaining backed by the threat and, when
4
necessary, use of economic weapons.
Perhaps channeled by this judicial view, when states began
enacting public employee collective bargaining statutes, they modeled
them largely on the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). They
changed the model as they believed appropriate for the public sector,
most commonly with respect to the definition of bargaining units and
the prohibition of work stoppages. But they adopted the basic NLRA
approach to classifying subjects for collective bargaining. Under this
all or nothing approach to worker voice in workplace decisionmaking; if a subject is considered a mandatory subject of bargaining,
duties to act in subjective good faith, to not bypass the exclusive
representative and deal directly with employees, to provide the
exclusive representative with relevant information, and the right to
insist on a position to the point of impasse and resort to economic
pressure attach. If the subject is not one of mandatory bargaining, it is
subject to complete unilateral employer control. There is no
requirement that employees be given a voice, and, if the employer
wishes to give employees a voice, it may do so selectively and ignore
3. For example, in a March 10, 2011, op. ed. in the Wall Street Journal, Wisconsin
Governor Walker attacked collective bargaining agreements for their wage rates, health
insurance and pension provisions, and use of seniority. He compared public employee health
and pension benefits to those of the private sector. He argued that his budget repair bill would
give public employers “the tools to reward productive workers and improve their operations.
Most crucially, our reforms confront the barriers of collective bargaining that currently block
innovation and reform.” Scott Walker, Op.-Ed., Why I’m Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL. ST. J.,
Mar. 10, 2011, at A17.
4. See JOSEPH E. SLATER, PUBLIC WORKERS: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, THE
LAW AND THE STATE 1900-1962, at 71-95 (2004).
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their exclusive representative.
Regardless of the merits of this model in the private sector, it has
many negative consequences in the public sector. In prior articles, I
have shown how, out of concern that many subjects which in the
private sector would clearly be mandatorily bargainable implicate
important issues of public policy in the public sector, the scope of
bargaining in the public sector has been narrowed considerably.
Moreover, when such subjects are considered mandatorily
bargainable, the emphasis is placed on their impact on employees’
economic interests rather than on employee interests in having a
voice in improving the delivery of public services. For example, the
majority view is that class size is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining because it raises issues of educational policy, but those
jurisdictions that require bargaining over class size do so to give
teachers a voice in determining their workload rather than as a means
for giving teachers a voice in the impact of class size on the quality of
5
instruction.
When worker voice is channeled so narrowly, it is not surprising
that workers’ representatives exert the full force of their bargaining
power in those narrow areas. For example, in Wisconsin in the 1990s,
the legislature enacted the qualified economic offer (QEO) which
essentially ended bargaining over teacher salaries as long as the
employer made an offer in accordance with a statutorily prescribed
6
formula. The effect was to channel teacher unions into negotiating
benefits which were not subject to the QEO and it is not surprising
7
that they did so successfully. Nor is it surprising that unions will act
to stifle innovations when they have been excluded from having a
voice in the formulation of such innovations.
Experience indicates, however, that when, in spite of the legal
doctrine, workers are given a voice in issues concerning the quality of
public services, they respond very positively. For example, when
teacher evaluation standards are developed and implemented
unilaterally by management, we should not be surprised to see
5. See Martin H. Malin, The Paradox in Public Sector Labor Law, 84 IND. L.J. 1369
(2009); Martin H. Malin & Charles Taylor Kerchner, Charter Schools and Collective Bargaining:
Compatible Marriage or Illegitimate Relationship?, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 885 (2007).
6. Wis. Act 16, 1993 Wis. Sess. Laws 26 (codified at WIS. STAT. § 111.70(1) (2010)). In
2009, Wisconsin repealed the QEO in Wis. Act 28, 2009 Wis. Sess. Laws 179 (Assemb. 75, 200910 Leg. (Wis. 2009)). The text of the Act is available at <https://docs.legis.wisconsin.
gov/2009/related/acts/28.pdf>.
7. I acknowledge Bruce Meredith, former general counsel of the Wisconsin Education
Association Council, for this point.
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teacher unions employ all methods at their disposal to protect their
members from attack under the unilaterally imposed regime.
However when, in spite of the law, school districts and teachers
collaborate on developing and implementing evaluation standards
through peer review processes, teacher unions tend to be transformed
from defenders of the irremediably incompetent to protectors of
8
professional standards.
In my prior work, I have related numerous examples of the
positive impact of worker voice in the public sector enterprise that
9
occurred in spite of rather than because of the law. Other scholars
10
have pointed to additional examples. Many employers have
recognized the benefits of involving employees through their
exclusive bargaining representatives in the decision-making process.
For example, during the debates over the Wisconsin Budget Repair
Bill, the Wisconsin Association of School Boards reported that many
of its members were “gravely concerned” that the bill would
“immeasurably harm the collaborative relationships that exist
11
between school boards and teachers.” And hundreds of local
government officials in Wisconsin signed an open letter to the
12
governor opposing the bill on similar grounds.
A particularly striking example of management recognition of
the benefits of organized worker voice comes from the federal
government. On October 1, 1993, President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12,871, which, among other things, established the National
Partnership Council and called for the creation of labor-management
partnerships throughout the Executive Branch. The goal of such
partnerships was to “champion change in Federal government
agencies to transform them into organizations capable of delivering
13
the highest quality services to the American people.” The
8. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 5, at 904-06.
9. See Malin, supra, note 5, at 1392-96; Malin & Kerchner, supra note 5, at 903-11.
10. See, e.g., DAVID LEWIN ET AL., EMP’T POLICY RESEARCH NETWORK & LABOR AND
EMP’T RELATIONS ASS’N, GETTING IT RIGHT: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS FROM RESEARCH ON PUBLIC-SECTOR UNIONISM AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 16-22 (2011), available at <http://www.employmentpolicy.org/sites/www.em
ploymentpolicy.org/files/EPRN%20PS%20draft%203%2016%2011%20PM%20FINALtk-ml4
%20edits.pdf>.
11. Letter from John H. Ashley, Executive Director, Wis. Ass’n of Sch. Bds. to Hon.
Alberta Darling & Hon. Robin Vos, Co-chairs, Wis. Legislature Joint Comm. on Fin. (Feb. 15,
2011) (copy on file with author).
12. See Erin Richards et al., Clash Continues: Budget Battle: Day 12 Many City Officials
Think Union Limits Go Too Far, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 27, 2011, at B1, available at
2011 WLNR 3854288.
13. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655 (1993).
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partnerships established under the executive order produced
14
numerous outcomes beneficial to the public. Nevertheless, in one of
his first acts as president, President George W. Bush repealed the
15
executive order.
There are many reasons why management desires employee
involvement through exclusive representatives in workplace decisionmaking. Studies find that the most productive workplaces are
16
unionized workplaces with high levels of employee involvement.
Black and Lynch’s work simulated a base case of a non-union
manufacturer with little employee involvement. They found that
unionized firms with little employee involvement had productivity
levels 15 percent lower than the base case. Non-unionized firms with
high employee involvement had productivity levels 10.6 percent
higher than the base case. But “adding unionization to this already
high-performing workplace is associated with an impressive 20
17
percent increase in labor productivity.” They then examined the
actual mean characteristics of unionized and nonunionized firms in a
sample of manufacturers. They found that the unionized firms
averaged productivity 16 percent higher than the base case while the
nonunionized firms’ productivity averaged 11 percent lower than the
18
base case.
Why do unionized workplaces with high levels of employee
involvement outperform all other types of workplaces? Black &
Lynch attribute some of this to greater levels of job security in
19
unionized workplaces. It seems intuitive that employees who need
not fear job loss in retaliation for suggestions with which their
superiors disagree will be more forthcoming with those suggestions. I
suggest the advantages go beyond that, however. In unionized
environments, management has a specific representative, one freely
chosen by the employees, to turn to as a partner. Moreover, decisions
resulting from such management-union partnerships are more likely
to be perceived as legitimate by the workforce as a whole, thereby
smoothing their implementation.

14. See Malin, supra note 5, at 1395-96.
15. Exec. Order No. 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2001).
16. See LEWIN ET AL., supra note 10, at 22-26.
17. Sandra E. Black & Lisa M. Lynch, The New Workplace: What Does It Mean for
Productivity?, in INDUS. RELATIONS ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL
MEETING 60, 65 (Paula B. Voos ed. 1998).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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In his Wall Street Journal op. ed., Wisconsin Governor Walker
maintained that the legislative reform in Wisconsin would “confront
the barriers of collective bargaining that currently block innovation
20
and reform.” I submit that, to the extent that barriers to innovation
and reform exist, they stem from the NLRA model that mandates
that matters are subject either to traditional collective bargaining or
left to complete unilateral employer control. Meaningful reform must
look for vehicles to expand worker voice in positive ways by looking
at models outside the traditional NLRA approach to all or nothing
collective bargaining.
In this article, I evaluate the legislative “reforms” enacted in the
current tsunami against this goal. Part II examines the changes in the
various states to their public sector labor relations regimes and finds
that generally, rather than provide reforms which will improve the
delivery of public services, the tsunami that hit the public sector
workplace only enhanced unilateral employer control. Part III
concludes that these reforms are doomed to failure and will serve to
further inhibit innovations by increasing legal barriers beyond those
that the traditional collective bargaining regime posed. Part IV
examines reforms in two states, Indiana and Tennessee, that on their
face appear promising. However, as Part IV demonstrates, those
appearances are deceiving and the reforms are illusory. Part V finds a
few glimmers of hope in recent developments and suggests ways that
might lead to meaningful reform through redirected employee voice
in the public sector workplace.
21

II. THE TSUNAMI

In this part, I review the changes enacted in twelve states: Idaho,
Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. The Ohio
legislation was overturned by voters in a referendum in November
2011 and, therefore, never went into effect. The Idaho legislation was
rejected by voters in a referendum in November 2012. However, they
are included because they fit within the overall tone of the tsunami
that hit public sector labor law in the past year two years.
The numerous state enactments share a common characteristic.
They replace collective representation with unilateral employer
20. Walker, supra note 3.
21. This Part draws on my article, The Upheaval in Public Sector Labor Law: A Search for
Common Elements, 27 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 149(2012).
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control. They do so by eliminating collective bargaining rights,
restricting the scope of bargaining and, where bargaining is allowed,
changing impasse procedures to strengthen employer control, and in
the case of interest arbitration, to strengthen legislative control over
the process. Finally, they facilitate the abrogation of collective
bargaining agreements during times of fiscal distress. Rather than
proceed state-by-state, I will highlight these characteristics and
explain which states’ enactments exhibit them.
A. Eliminating Collective Bargaining Rights
Two states, Oklahoma and Tennessee, repealed statutes that
provided public employees with collective bargaining rights. On April
29, 2011, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin signed House Bill 1593
repealing the Oklahoma Municipal Employee Collective Bargaining
Act, which had guaranteed the rights to organize and bargain
collectively to employees of municipalities with populations above
22
35,000. The repeal leaves the decision to bargain to the
municipalities’ discretion. The repeal’s sponsors argued that it was
necessary to restore local control over the decision to bargain
23
24
collectively. The governor maintained that it would control costs.
Tennessee repealed the Education Professional Negotiations
Act, which had provided teachers with the right to organize and
bargain collectively since 1978, and replaced it with the Professional
25
Educators Collaborative Conferencing Act of 2011. The Tennessee
Senate had voted to repeal the collective bargaining law but the state
House of Representatives had voted to limit the scope of bargaining
26
rather than repeal it. The following day, a conference committee
22. Okla. H.R. 1593, 53d Leg., 2d Sess. (Okla. 2011); see Bill Information for HB 1593
(2011-2012), OKLA. STATE LEGISLATURE, <http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=
hb1593&Session=1100> (last viewed Dec. 3, 2012).
23. See Barbara Hoberock, Oklahoma Gov. Fallin Signs Bill to End Collective Bargaining,
TULSA WORLD, Apr. 29, 2011, at A8 (quoting Representative Steve Martin); Sean Murphy,
Oklahoma Senate Approves Anti-Union Rights Bill, TULSA WORLD (last modified Apr. 19,
2011, 2:24 PM), <http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&articleid=2011
0419_336_0_OKLAHO385498> (quoting Senator Cliff Aldridge).
24. Hoberock, supra note 23. Interestingly, the Oklahoma House defeated another bill,
House Bill 1576, which would have amended Oklahoma’s police and firefighter collective
bargaining statute by giving municipalities the option of accepting the award of an interest
arbitrator or rejecting it and returning to negotiations. Bill Information for HB 1576 (20112012), OKLA. STATE LEGISLATURE, <http://www.oklegislature.gov/BillInfo.aspx?Bill=hb1576
&Session=1100> (last viewed Dec. 3, 2012).
25. 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378 (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-5-601 (2011)).
26. See Richard Locker, Teacher Collective Bargaining Bill Hinges on GOP, MEMPHIS
COM. APPEAL (updated May 19, 2011, 11:30 PM), <http://www.commercialappeal.com/
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voted for the repeal which passed later that day in both houses. The
details of the Collaborative Conferencing Act are discussed in Part
III.
Several states, while not repealing their public employee
collective bargaining statutes, amended them to deny collective
bargaining rights to certain groups of employees. Nevada took
28
bargaining rights away from doctors, lawyers, and some supervisors.
Had it not been rejected by voters, the Ohio enactment would have
taken bargaining rights away from university faculty who participate
29
in faculty governance and certain police and firefighter supervisors.
The Wisconsin statute took away collective bargaining rights
from state university faculty, all employees of the UW Hospitals and
30
Clinics, and day care and home health care providers. Although the
act did not repeal the Municipal Employee Relations Act or the State
Employee Relations Act, it effectively abolished collective bargaining
for all public employees except for many law enforcement and fire
protection personnel by prohibiting bargaining on any subject other
than “base wages,” which the act expressly provides excludes
overtime, premium pay, merit pay, performance pay, supplemental
31
pay, and pay progressions. Furthermore, base wages may not
increase more than the increase in the consumer price index (CPI) as
of 180 days before the expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement unless higher base wages are approved in a public
32
referendum. In many respects, employees in Oklahoma have more
protection for collective bargaining than employees in Wisconsin.
Although Oklahoma repealed its statute that mandated collective
bargaining rights in mid-sized municipalities, it allows collective
bargaining at the option of the employer. Wisconsin prohibits
news/2011/may/19/tennessee-house-votes-limit-collective-bargaining/>.
27. See Richard Locker, Tennessee Legislature OKs Ban of Teacher Bargaining, MEMPHIS
COM. APPEAL (updated May 21, 2011, 7:40 AM), <http://www.commercialappeal.com
/news/2011/may/20/new-version-bill-repeals-collective-bargaining-tea/>. Critics of the repeal
charged that it was Republican retaliation against the Tennessee Education Association for
supporting more Democrats than Republicans in the 2010 elections, noting that Representative
Glen Casada, chair of the Republican caucus had asked the union prior to the elections to
increase its campaign contributions to Republicans to equal what it was giving to Democrats.
Locker, supra note 26.
28. S. 98, §§ 5, 6, 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011) (codified at NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.140 (2011)).
29. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4117.01(K), (C)(10), (F)(2)).
30. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §§ 265 (state university faculty), 279 (UW Hospitals and clinics), 280
(day and home healthcare providers).
31. Id. §314.
32. Id.
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collective bargaining even if the employer is willing to engage in it. It
is not surprising that the Wisconsin act repealed the declarations in
the Municipal and State Employee Relations Acts which had found
34
public employee collective bargaining to be in the public interest.
B. Limiting the Scope of Bargaining
By far, the most numerous changes made in the tsunami of 2011
concerned the scope of bargaining. Numerous state legislatures have
removed, and in many cases prohibited, bargaining over a wide range
of subjects. Some subjects removed from the bargaining table are
directly related to compensation, while others deal with working
conditions. Regardless, the legislatures are giving public sector
employers the tools of command, control, and unilateral imposition.
The item of compensation most frequently removed from the
bargaining table has been health care. Although most law
enforcement and fire protection personnel were exempted from the
Wisconsin budget repair act’s prohibition on bargaining anything
other than base wages, the state’s regular biannual budget act
prohibited bargaining over law enforcement and firefighter health
35
insurance. Ohio’s enactment deemed “not appropriate” for
bargaining inter alia health care benefits, except that the parties may
36
agree that the employer will pay up to 85 percent of the premiums.
New Jersey suspended bargaining over health care benefits for
four years while a new statute is phased in. The statute sets a sliding
scale according to salary of mandatory employee contributions to
health care premiums and provides for health care plans to be
designed by two state committees, one for education and one for rest
37
of public sector.
Massachusetts enacted a new method for local governments to
make changes in health insurance. The governing body may adopt
changes along with estimated cost savings and proof of the savings. It
gives notice to each bargaining unit and a retiree representative. The
retiree representative and the bargaining unit representatives form a
public employee committee which negotiates with the employer for
33. Id. § 169.
34. Id. § 261.
35. 2011 Wis. Act 32 § 2409.
36. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
4117.08(B)(2), (E)).
37. 2011 N. J. Laws 78.
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up to thirty days. After thirty days, the matter is submitted to a tripartite committee which, within ten days, can approve the employer’s
proposed changes, reject them, or remand for additional information.
38
The committee’s decision is final.
Idaho limited negotiations for teachers to “compensation,” which
it defined as salary and benefits, including insurance, leave time, and
39
sick leave. Previously, the subjects of negotiations were specified in a
negotiations agreement between the parties. The Idaho enactment
also limited collective bargaining agreements to one fiscal year, July 1
through June 30, and prohibited evergreen clauses or other provisions
to the effect that an agreement continues until a new agreement is
40
reached. In November 2012, voters rejected the Idaho enactment by
41
a vote of 57.1 perecnt to 42.7 percent.
Similar to Idaho, Indiana limited collective bargaining for
teachers to wages and salary and wage related fringe benefits
42
including insurance, retirement benefits, and paid time off. The
statute permits collective bargaining agreements to have grievance
procedures, but strikes the prior law’s express authorization for the
43
grievance procedure to culminate in binding arbitration. The new
statute prohibits bargaining on everything else, including express
prohibitions on bargaining school calendar, teacher dismissal
procedures and criteria, restructuring options, contracting with an
educational entity that provides post-secondary credits to students,
44
and teacher evaluation procedures and criteria. It also prohibits any
45
contract that would place a school district in a deficit and prohibits
collective bargaining agreements from extending beyond the end of
46
the state budget biennium. The new law repeals a prior provision
38. 2011 Mass. Acts 69 (approved July 12, 2011). Media reports suggested that in April
when the Massachusetts House passed more restrictive legislation, President Obama’s director
of intergovernmental affairs telephoned Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick. The governor
negotiated changes with labor leaders whose attitude changed from a vow to fight the legislation
“to the bitter end” to support and congratulations to the governor for “listening to labor’s
concerns.” See Michael Levenson, National Scrutiny for Mass. Labor Law, BOSTON GLOBE,
July 12, 2011, Metro, at 1.
39. S. 1108 § 17, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011).
40. Id. § 22.
41. Idaho Sec’y of State, Election Div., Nov. 6, 2012 General Election Results, Proposition
1, <http://sos.idaho.gov/elect/RESULTS/2012/General/tot_stwd.htm> (last viewed Dec. 28,
2012.)
42. 2011 Ind. Acts 575 §14.
43. Id. § 17.
44. Id. § 15.
45. Id. § 13.
46. Id. § 16.
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that authorized parties to agree to arbitrate teacher dismissals.
In addition to health care benefits, the Ohio enactment deemed
the following inappropriate for collective bargaining: provisions
restricting contracting out or providing severance pay to employees
whose jobs are contracted out; provisions that grant more than six
weeks of vacation, more than twelve holidays, or more than three
personal days; payment of employee contributions to retirement
systems; minimum staffing provisions; and restrictions on school
district authority to assign personnel, class size, reductions in force of
educational employees, and the use of seniority as the sole factor in
48
reductions in force.
Michigan added to an already lengthy list of prohibited subjects
of bargaining for educational personnel. Decision and impact
bargaining are now prohibited with respect to: placement of teachers;
reductions in force and recalls; performance evaluation systems; the
development, content, standards, procedures, adoption, and
implementation of a policy regarding employee discharge or
discipline; the format, timing, and number of classroom visits; the
development, content, standards, procedures, adoption, and
implementation of the method of employee compensation and
decisions about how an employee performance evaluation is used to
determine performance-based compensation; and the development,
format, content, and procedures of notice to parents and legal
guardians of pupils taught by a teacher who has been rated as
49
ineffective.
Illinois amended its Educational Labor Relations Act to provide
that in the Chicago Public Schools, the length of the school day and
the length of the school year are permissive, rather than mandatory,
50
subjects of bargaining. The amendment responded to calls from the
Mayor of Chicago to authorize his appointed school board and
management team to increase the school day unilaterally in light of
the Chicago Teachers Union’s failure in the past to agree to such

47. Id. § 6.
48. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. STAT. ANN. §§
4117.08(B)(4) (contracting out), 4117.105(B)(contracting out), 4117.108(A)(1) (vacation),
4117.108(A)(2)-(3) (holiday & personal time), 4771.08(B)(3), 4117.08(B)(5) (staffing),
4117.081(B)(1) (school district authority to assign), 4117.081(B)(3) (class size), 4117.081(B)(4)
(RIF-educational employees), 306.04(B) (seniority-transit), 709.012 (seniority-firefighters),
3316.07(A)(11) (seniority-teachers)).
49. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 103.
50. S. 7 § 10, 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
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increases.

51

C. Advantaging the Employer in Impasse Resolution
It seems intuitive that the type of impasse resolution procedure a
52
state adopts will have a significant effect on collective negotiations.
The most extreme approach, and the one which gives the employer
the most power, leaves terms and conditions of employment up to the
employer if negotiations do not lead to agreement. This approach,
often decried by labor as “collective begging” rather than collective
bargaining was adopted in the Idaho enactment that voters
overturned. The Idaho legislation repealed the prior requirement of
53
factfinding. Under the Idaho enactment, the parties were authorized
but not required to enter mediation if they had not reached
54
agreement by May 10. If they did not reach agreement by June 10,
the school board was required to unilaterally set the terms and
55
conditions of employment for the coming school year by June 22.
The statute did not expressly restrict the school board’s actions,
thereby leaving open the possibility that the school board could have
established terms never offered to the union. With evergreen clauses
prohibited, Idaho school boards may have been tempted to surface
56
bargain, run out the clock, and unilaterally set terms.
Wisconsin prohibited interest arbitration for all employees
57
except most law enforcement and firefighters. Wisconsin now has no
impasse procedures for most public employees. Of course, with
bargaining limited to base wages and further effectively limited to the
change in the CPI, there may not be much need for impasse
resolution.
51. See Noreen S. Ahmed-Ullah & Kristen Mack, Emmanuel Sees Longer School Days,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2011, at 6.
52. But see Thomas Kochan et al., The Long Haul Effects of Interest Arbitration: The Case
of New York State’s Taylor Law, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565 (2010) (finding no significant
differences on wage rate outcomes when negotiated under interest arbitration or non-binding
factfinding regimes).
53. S. 1108 § 22, 61st Leg. (Idaho 2011).
54. Id. § 20.
55. Id.
56. Interestingly, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that teacher strikes are not
automatically enjoinable but are subject to a defense of school board unclean hands due to bad
faith in the negotiations process. Sch. Dist. No. 351 Oneida Cnty. v. Oneida Educ. Ass’n, 567
P.2d 830 (Idaho 1977). The court assumed, but did not decide, that teacher strikes were illegal,
and one concurring justice opined that teacher strikes were lawful, there being no express
statute prohibiting them. Id. at 836 (Bakes, J., concurring the judgment and dissenting in part).
57. 2011 Wis. Act 10 §234.
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Since 1984, Ohio has recognized a right to strike for most public
employees and a right to interest arbitration for the others. Ohio
voters rejected the legislative enactment which would have prohibited
strikes by all public employees and enforced the prohibition with
fines for strikers of two days’ pay for each day on strike, discipline or
discharge of strikers, loss of dues checkoff for striking unions, and
58
strike injunctions. The Ohio enactment also would have prohibited
interest arbitration.
In place of strikes and interest arbitration, the Ohio enactment
mandated factfinding if no agreement was reached forty-five days
before the scheduled expiration of an existing contract. The statute
required that the factfinder’s primary consideration be the public
interest and welfare and the employer’s ability to pay, and limited the
factfinder to considering the employer’s financial status as of time
period surrounding negotiations, precluding consideration of
potential increases in employer revenue or employer ability to sell
assets. The enactment allowed either party by majority vote within
fifteen days following the factfinder’s recommendations to reject
them, leading to the State Employment Relations Board publicizing
the recommendations. Absent agreement reached within five days
after publication, the parties were to submit their last best offers to
the employer’s legislative body which was to have its chief financial
officer certify which offer cost more and hold a public hearing. Within
fifteen days following contract expiration, the legislative body was to
pick one party’s final offer, with the employer’s offer governing if no
59
selection was made.
States that did not prohibit interest arbitration severely restricted
arbitrator discretion. New Jersey amended its police and firefighter
interest arbitration provisions to eliminate party selection of the
arbitrator; the arbitrator is randomly selected by the Public
Employment Relations Commission from a special PERC panel; the
award must issue within forty-five days of arbitrator appointment
(prior law allowed 120 days). The parties must present written
estimates of the financial impact of their final offers. The award must
address all statutory criteria and certify that the arbitrator took
statutory limitations imposed by a local levy cap into account. The
award may be appealed to PERC which must decide the appeal
58. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.12(B)(4)).
59. Id. (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4117.14 (D)(2)).
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within thirty days, must address all statutory factors and must certify
that it took the levy cap into account. The statute caps arbitrator fees
at $1000 per day and $7500 total, and caps cancellation fees at $500; it
fines arbitrators $1000 per day for being late. The award may not
increase base salary items by more than 2 percent of the aggregate
amount expended by the employer in the twelve months immediately
preceding expiration of the prior contract and may not include base
salary items and other economic issues that were not included in the
60
prior contract. The cap on base salaries sunsets on April 1, 2014.
In Nebraska, interest arbitration is performed by the
Commission of Industrial Relations (CIR), whose members are
appointed by the governor. The new Nebraska act provides detailed
criteria for selecting an array of comparable communities, specifies
how many comparable communities must be selected, and mandates
that if the employer at issue pays compensation that is between 98
percent and 102 percent of the average of the comparables, including
fringe benefits, then the CIR must leave compensation as it is. If the
employer’s compensation is below 98 percent of the average, the CIR
is to order it raised to 98 percent and if it is above 102 percent, the
CIR is to order it lowered to 102 percent. The targets are reduced to
95 to 100 percent during periods of recession, defined as two
consecutive quarters in which the state’s net sales and use taxes and
individual and corporate income tax receipts are below those of the
61
prior year.
Illinois tweaked its right to strike for most employees in public
education and substantially restricted it for employees of the Chicago
Public Schools. For school districts other than the Chicago Public
Schools (CPS), if there is no agreement within forty-five days of the
start of the school year, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board must invoke mediation. After fifteen days of mediation, either
party may declare impasse. Seven days later, each party submits its
final offer and cost summary. Seven days thereafter, the final offers
are made public. No strike is allowed until at least fourteen days after
62
publication of final offers.
For the Chicago Public Schools, if no agreement is reached after
a reasonable period of mediation, the dispute is submitted to
factfinding upon demand of either party. Factfinding is tri-partite
60. 2010 N.J.Laws 1204.
61. Leg. 397, 102d Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2011).
62. S. 7 §13(b)(2), 97th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2011).
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unless the parties agree otherwise. If there is no settlement within
seventy-five days, the factfinder issues a private report with
recommendations, which the parties have fifteen days to reject. If
rejected, the recommendations are made public. There may be no
strike for thirty days following publication and no strike unless
63
authorized by 75 percent of union membership.
D. Abrogating Contracts in Times of Fiscal Distress
64

In National Treasury Employees Union v. Chertoff, the D.C.
Circuit, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Harry Edwards,
invalidated regulations of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) because they were inconsistent with the Homeland Security
Act’s requirement that DHS’s personnel system ensure that
employees may bargain collectively. Among other grounds for the
invalidation was the regulations’ provision allowing management to
abrogate collective bargaining agreements. The court quoted with
approval the district court’s observation that the “sine qua non of
good faith collective bargaining is an enforceable contract once the
65
parties reach an agreement,” and its analysis that “[a] contract that is
not mutually binding is not a contract. Negotiations that lead to a
contract that is not mutually binding are not true negotiations. A
system of ‘collective bargaining’ that permits the unilateral
repudiation of agreements by one party is not collective bargaining at
66
all.”
The tsunami of 2011 that hit the states looks toward the
abrogation of collective bargaining agreements in times of fiscal
distress. Nevada required contracts to provide for reopening in times
67
of fiscal emergency. The voter-rejected Ohio enactment provided for
modification or termination of contracts if the state placed a local
68
government on fiscal watch or fiscal emergency. The most far
reaching enactment was the Michigan Local Government and School
69
District Fiscal Accountability Act of 2011. It specified procedures
63. Id. §13(b)(2.10).
64. 452 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
65. Id. at 851.
66. Id.
67. S. 98 §7(2)(w), 76th Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2011).
68. S. 5, 29th Gen. Assemb. (Ohio 2011) (amending OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
4117.104(A)).
69. 2011 Mich. Pub. Acts 4 (2011). The law was rejected by referendum in the November
2012 election. See Nancy Kaffer, Voters Reject Attacks on Constitution, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
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that could lead to a finding by the state of financial emergency. Upon
such a finding, the governor would have appointed an emergency
manager who, among other things, would have the power to reject all
or part of a collective bargaining agreement upon finding that the
financial emergency created a circumstance where it was reasonable
and necessary for the state to intervene, the rejection was reasonable
and necessary to deal with a broad, generalized economic problem,
rejection was directly related to and designed to address the financial
emergency, and rejection was temporary and did not target specific
classes of employees.
A potentially very significant development concerning the
integrity of collective bargaining agreements will likely come from the
Illinois courts. AFSCME and the State of Illinois entered into a
collective bargaining agreement effective September 5, 2008 through
June 30, 2012. The contract provided for raises totaling 15.25 percent
70
over the life of the agreement. In response to the Great Recession,
the union agreed to concessions that saved the state approximately,
$400,000,000.00. These concessions included agreement to defer a 4
percent wage increase that was to take effect July 1, 2011, to 2 percent
effective effective July 1, 2011 and 2 percent effective February 1,
2012. The state also agreed not to lay off any bargaining unit
71
employees through the end of the 2012 fiscal year.
As the July 1, 2011 raise approached, the state sought additional
concessions but the union refused. The state then refused to put the 2
percent wage increase into effect, and the union grieved. An
arbitrator sustained the union’s grievance and awarded that the state
72
pay the 2 percent wage increase. Subsequently, the state announced
layoffs. The union grieved, and the matter proceeded before the same
arbitrator who issued an award prohibiting the layoffs because they
Nov. 7, 2012, at 1. However, the lame duck legislature reenacted it and included in the
enactment an appropiation provision, intended to prevent another referendum. 2012 Mich. Pub.
Acts 436 (2012); see Chad Livengood & Shaun D. Lewis, New EM Law Could be Used to
Appoint a Financial Czar in Detroit, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 28, 2012, at <http://www.
detroitnews.com/article/20121228/POLITICS02/212280373>.
70. See AFSCME Council 31 and State of Illinois Contract Changes 22-23 (Sept. 5, 2008June 30, 2012), available at <http://www2.illinois.gov/cms/employees/personnel/documents/
emp_afscme08chg.pdf>
71. See State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31, Arb. Ref. 10.251 2011-2012 Layoffs and
Facility Closures, at 3 (October 3, 2011) (Edwin H. Benn, Arb.), available at <http://www.state.
il.us/ilrb/subsections/pdfs/ArbitrationAwards/State%20of%20Illinois%20&%20AFSCME,%20
Layoffs%20&%20Facility%20Closures.pdf>.
72. State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31, Arb. Ref. 10.251 July 1, 2011 Increases (July
19, 2011) (Edwin H. Benn, Arb.), available at <http://www.state.il.us/ilrb/subsections/
pdfs/ArbitrationAwards/State%20of%20Illinois%20&%20AFSCME,20pay%20raises.pdf>.
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violated the state’s agreement not to lay off bargaining unit
73
employees in exchange for economic concessions.
The state has sued to vacate both awards. The state argues that
section 21 of the Illinois Public Employment Relations Act, which
authorizes multi-year collective bargaining agreements “[s]ubject to
74
the appropriation power of the employer,” precludes enforcement of
the award because the state legislature failed to appropriate sufficient
funds to fund the wage increases or the no-layoff commitment. The
state also argues that enforcement of the awards would violate the
Illinois Constitution which, it contends, prohibits the executive
branch from expending funds that the legislature has failed to
appropriate. The Circuit Court of Cook County ordered the state to
pay the raises to the extent it has appropriated funds and to pay the
75
balance plus interest at a later date. The state has appealed. If the
state is successful, Illinois public employers will have the power to
abrogate the economic provisions of multi-year collective bargaining
agreements by refusing to appropriate funds needed to comply.
III. THE TSUNAMI’S WRECKAGE
The tsunami of 2011 has swept in new regimes in many states
that allow for unilateral, top-down employer control over employees’
76
work lives. We have seen this before, and the picture was not pretty.
On October 1, 1993, President Clinton issued Executive Order
12,871, which, among other things, established a National Partnership
Council and required the establishment of labor-management
partnerships throughout the executive branch. Among the many
successful labor-management partnerships was one between the
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) and the U.S. Customs
Service. That partnership designed a seven-step strategy to increase
seizures of illegal drugs which, during its six month life, resulted in a
42 percent increase in narcotics seizures and a 74 percent increase in
73. State of Illinois & AFSCME Council 31, Arb. Ref. 10.251 2011-2012 Layoffs and
Facility Closures, supra note 71.
74. 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/21 (2010).
75. Doug Finke, Judge Orders Quinn to Honor State Employee Raises, ST. J. REGISTER,
Dec. 7, 2012, at <http://www.sj-r.com/breaking/x1665846618/Judge-orders-Quinn-to-honor-stateemployee-contract-raises>.
76. Early results in Wisconsin indicated a mixed bag with some employers unilaterally
changing working conditions while others work cooperatively with employees’ representatives.
See Steven Verburg, New Work Rules Set in as Contracts Lapse, WIS. STATE J., Dec. 25, 2011, at
A1, available at <http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govtandpolitics/newworkrulessetin
ascontractslapse/article_da55410c bb86 55a6 8ffa 71bb933fe4be.html?mode=story>.
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currency seizures. Following the election of President George W.
Bush, the Heritage Foundation urged him to rescind Executive Order
12,871 because it impeded the type of top-down control thought
78
necessary to implement the administration’s policy agenda.
President Bush appeared to listen. During his first month in office, he
revoked the Clinton executive order and directed heads of all
executive agencies to “[p]romptly move to rescind any orders, rules,
regulations, guidelines, or policies implementing or enforcing
79
Executive Order 12,871 . . .” Adopting the model of unilateral, topdown control, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, the
successor agency to the Customs Service, among other things,
imposed a rule prohibiting CBP agents from having facial hair. This
led to a lengthy battle with NTEU in which NTEU successfully
80
fought the new rule. Which is the better use of the time of unions
and public managers: cooperatively devising improvements in the
interdiction of illegal narcotics and currency or fighting over whether
the agent who greets persons entering the country may have a beard
or mustache?
As discussed earlier, experience suggests that the most efficient,
productive environments are those in which organized employees are
highly involved in workplace decision-making. Despite Governor
Walker’s belief that top-down unilateral control will lead to better
government, the likelihood is that improvements in workplace
efficiency, productivity, and public service, if they occur at all, will do
so in spite of, rather than because of, the tsunami.
IV. ILLUSIONS OF HOPE: INDIANA AND TENNESSEE
As we sift through the tsunami’s wreckage, enactments from
Indiana and Tennessee appear to shine as potential diamonds in the
rough. Closer examination, however, reveals that the diamonds are
fake and any hope they may offer as a path to constructive employee
involvement in workplace decision-making that leads to improved
77. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS.
THE PRESIDENT § III (2000).

MGMT., LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP: A REPORT TO

78. GEORGE NESTERCZUK ET AL., THE HERITAGE FOUND., TAKING CHARGE OF
FEDERAL PERSONNEL (2001).
79. Exec. Order 13,203, 3 C.F.R. 761 (2001).
80. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. FLRA, 550 F.3d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Customs & Border Protection & Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 10 FSIP 10
(2011); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs & Border Protection, 65 F.L.R.A. 98 (2010); Nat’l
Treasury Emps. Union, 64 F.L.R.A. 395 (2010); Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Customs & Border
Protection, 62 F.L.R.A. 263 (2007); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 62 F.L.R.A. 267 (2007).
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public service is illusory.
As discussed above, Indiana severely restricted the scope of
bargaining for its public school teachers. But buried in the statute is a
provision that the parties shall discuss curriculum development and
revision, textbook selection, teaching methods, hiring, evaluation,
promotion, demotion, transfer, assignment and retention, student
discipline, expulsion or supervision of students, pupil/teacher ratio,
81
class size or budget appropriations, safety issues, and hours. This
provision suggests that Indiana might be requiring educational
employers to involve their employees in constructive dialogue
concerning the delivery of educational services. Hopes engendered by
this suggestion are quickly crushed, however. The same section
declares that any agreements reached in such discussions may not be
82
included in the contract. The message to employees and their unions
is, “Why bother? Anything that results from your discussions will not
be enforceable.”
Tennessee did not simply abolish collective bargaining for its
public school teachers. It replaced it with what the new statute calls
“collaborative conferencing.” Under the Collaborative Conferencing
Act, between October 1 and November 1, employees may file with
the school district a petition for collaborative conferencing supported
83
by a 15 percent showing of interest. The school board must appoint a
committee with equal representation of board members and
employees to conduct an election whereby employees vote whether
to engage in collaborative conferencing and, if so, who shall represent
84
them. The choices for representation must include “unaffiliated.” If
a majority vote for collaborative conferencing, the school board
appoints a team of between seven and eleven management personnel.
An equal number of employee representatives completes the
committee. Each employee representative option that received at
least 15 percent of the vote is entitled to proportional
85
representation. The committee that conducted the election selects
86
the representatives of the unaffiliated. The collaborative conferencing committee remains in effect for three years after which the

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

2011 Ind. Acts 575 §18.
Id.
2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 378, § 49-5-605(b)(1).
Id. §§49-5-605(b)(1) & (2).
Id. § 49-5-605(b)(4).
Id. § 49-5-605(b)(5).
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election process is repeated.
The act defines collaborative conferencing as “the process by
which [the parties] meet at reasonable times to confer, consult, and
discuss and to exchange information, opinions and proposals on
matters relating to the terms and conditions of professional employee
service, using the principles and techniques of interest-based
88
collaborative problem-solving.” The act prohibits refusing or failing
89
to participate in collaborative conferencing. The Tennessee statute
mandates collaborative conferencing with respect to salaries,
grievance procedures, insurance, fringe benefits other than retirement
90
benefits, working conditions, leave, and payroll deductions. It
requires the parties to jointly prepare a written memorandum of
understanding of any agreement reached but conditions portions of
an agreement requiring funding on the appropriation of such funding
91
by the relevant authority.
At first glance, the act appears to be an experiment in
proportionate representation and constructive employee involvement
in workplace decision-making. Closer scrutiny suggests that it may
well be a sham for unilateral employer control. The statute expressly
declares that the parties are not required to reach agreement and
provides that if no agreement is reached, the school board sets
92
employee terms and conditions of employment by board policy. The
act also appears to expressly authorize the director of schools to
bypass the employees’ representatives and deal directly with
93
individual employees. Beyond these provisions, the act is silent as to
the content of the duty to engage in collaborative conferencing.
Because Tennessee does not have a labor relations board to
administer the act, it presumably will be up to the Tennessee courts to
determine the content of the duty and the extent to which the
generally well-defined duty to bargain will be carried over to the duty
to engage in collaborative conferencing.
But perhaps good faith collaborative conferencing might lead to
constructive employee involvement in other areas of workplace
decision-making. Unfortunately, the Tennessee statute dashes such
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. § 49-5-605(b)(6)(A).
Id. § 49-5-602(2).
Id. §§ 49-5-606(a)(3) & (b)(2).
Id. § 49-5-608(a).
Id. § 49-5-609(b).
Id. § 49-5-609(d).
Id. § 49-5-608(c).
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hopes. It expressly prohibits collaborative conferencing with respect
to differential pay plans and incentive compensation, expenditure of
grants or awards, evaluations, staffing decisions, personnel decisions
concerning assignment of professional employees, and payroll
94
deductions for political activities. In so doing, it begs the question, if
the statute does not mandate bargaining but instead mandates only
interest-based problem solving, why prohibit the parties from talking
about anything? The prohibition strongly suggests that the statute’s
true purpose is to erect a sham that gives an illusion of collective
representation without the reality. As in Indiana, to the extent that
we see positive employee involvement in workplace decision-making,
it will be in spite of rather than because of the new law.
V. GLIMMERS OF REAL HOPE
Tsunamis and other natural disasters generally provide glimmers
of hope. People are found alive buried for days in the wreckage and
go on to complete recoveries. The tsunami that hit public sector labor
law may be no exception. In this part, I highlight a few glimmers of
hope, alive beneath the wreckage, that may blossom into thinking
outside the divide between mandatory traditional collective
bargaining and unilateral employer control.
The tsunami certainly left Michigan with a good deal of
wreckage. As discussed above, Michigan greatly expanded its list of
prohibited subjects of bargaining and provided for the abrogation of
collective bargaining agreements by employers in fiscal distress.
However, recently concluded bargaining between the state and a
coalition of unions representing state employees offers an alternative
approach that could blossom into true creative labor law reform.
Personal involvement from Michigan Governor Rick Snyder and
UAW President Bob King led to a major breakthrough in the
impasse that the parties faced. The agreement includes a letter of
understanding embracing a New Solutions report produced earlier in
the year by the unions which recommended cost savings that included
making government less top-heavy and spending less on contractors.
The letter of understanding commits to “[l]ean practices [that] rely on
joint participation between employees and management at all levels
within the state. World class service cannot occur without such
employee participation.” The contract calls for a New Solutions
94. Id. § 49-5-608(b).
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Committee – joint labor-management committee – to explore
95
innovative solutions. Successful constructive employee voice at the
state level could, perhaps, spread to local government and stimulate
innovative efforts at labor law reform that break out from the divide
between traditional adversarial bargaining and unilateral employer
96
control.
Ohio presents another glimmer of hope. On November 8, 2011,
the Ohio enactment was defeated by almost 62 percent of the
97
electorate. In the aftermath of this crushing rejection of the Ohio
legislature and Governor Kasich’s efforts to impose unilateral
employer control, Governor Kasich has acknowledged the need to
98
step back and reassess the approach to public sector labor relations.
Ohio embodies some very successful innovations in teacher
representation that go beyond the traditional divide between
mandatory subjects of bargaining and unilateral employer control.
99
These include some very successful peer review programs. As the
parties take a step back, perhaps they will focus on these successes
and look beyond the mandatory subjects-complete employer control
divide and consider creative approaches to labor law reform.
Perhaps the picture painted in this Part is overly optimistic.
Before we dismiss it as such, we should recognize that the tsunami has
led to traditional adversaries rethinking approaches to collective
representation of employees in workplace decision-making. For
example, the American Federation of Teachers and the American
Association of School administrators have partnered on a joint
100
approach to teacher evaluation and improvement of teacher quality.
95. See Paul Egan, Snyder, King Meeting Helped Break Contract Impasse, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Dec. 20, 2011, at A1, available at <http://www.freep.com/article/20111220/NEWS
06/112200395/How Gov Rick Snyder UAW President Bob King broke impasse led way to new
union deal?odyssey=tab|topnews|text|FRONTPAGE>.
96. Unfortunately, this glimmer of hope may be fading. Following the 2012 election, the
lame duck Michigan legislature passed Right to Work legislation and Governor Snyder signed
it, 2012 Mich. Pub. Acts 348, 349 (2012), severly straining his relatinshop with UAW President
King, See Brent Snavely, UAW President Bob King Tried to Talk Snyder Out of Right-to-Work
Push, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Dec. 6, 2012, at <http://www.freepress/article2012-1206/
News06/121206082).
97. The official vote tally is available at State Issue 2: November 8, 2011, OHIO SEC’Y OF
STATE, <http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/elections/Research/electResultsMain/2011results/201108
Issue2.aspx> (last viewed Dec. 3, 2012).
98. See Joe Vardon, Kasich Moves on from Loss on Issue 2, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov.
16, 2011, at 3B.
99. See Malin & Kerchner, supra note 5, at 904-06.
100. AM. FED’N OF TEACHERS & AM. ASS’N OF SCH. ADM’RS, EDUCATOR QUALITY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: A COLLABORATIVE EFFORT OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF
SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS (undated),
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The AASA-AFT collaboration suggests that we may be seeing moves
toward constructive leadership at the highest levels which could lead
to creative public-sector labor law reform.
School reform in Illinois provides an encouraging example of
collaboration resulting in creative alternatives to traditional collective
bargaining for providing for employee voice in workplace decision101
making.
In January 2010, Illinois enacted the Performance
102
Evaluation Reform Act (PERA). PERA requires school districts to
incorporate in their teacher evaluation plans indicators of student
growth as a significant factor in evaluating teacher performance. The
decision as to how to do so must be made by a committee consisting
of equal numbers of members appointed by the school district and the
teachers and their union. PERA makes clear that the use of student
growth in teacher evaluations is not a mandatory subject of
bargaining. In place of traditional bargaining, PERA calls for a
cooperative effort by school districts and their teachers but provides
that if, after 180 days, the joint committee is unable to agree on a
plan, the school district must adopt a default plan developed by the
103
Illinois State Board of Education.
In 2011, a lengthy series of meetings led by the Chair of the State
Senate Special Committee on Education Reform involving the major
teacher unions, school board and school administrator associations,
business, and community groups resulted in agreed-on reform
legislation enacted by the state legislature and signed by the
governor. The PERA model was used in part for reform of the
process for laying off teachers during a reduction in force. Prior to the
new act, state law required that untenured teachers be laid off first.
When tenured teachers had to be laid off, state law required that they
be selected in inverse order of seniority and that a teacher who lacked
seniority to retain his or her position could bump a junior teacher
from another position as long as he or she met the minimal state

available at <http://www.aft.org/pdfs/teachers/AFTAASA062811.pdf> (last viewed Dec. 3,
2012).
101. For an excellent discussion of the process and the results, see Mitchell Roth, S.B. 7: A
Union Perspective, ILL. PUB. EMP. REL. REP., Spring 2012, at 1; James Franczek & Amy
Dickerson, Education Reform in Illinois: Making Performance Count, ILL. PUB. EMP. REL.
REP., Winter 2012, at 1.
102. Pub. Act No. 96-0861, 2009 Ill. Laws 8655, available at <http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/
publicacts/96/PDF/096-0861.pdf>.
103. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5-24A-4(b) (2010). PERA makes an exception for the Chicago
Public Schools, allowing the Chicago School Board to implement its last best offer if the joint
committee is unable to reach agreement. Id. 5-24A-4(c).
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qualifications for that position. The new statute groups teachers into
four categories based on their most recent performance evaluations.
The first group to be laid off are non-tenured teachers with no
evaluation as of the date of the layoff notices. They are selected for
layoff first with the order within the group determined by the school
district. Next are teachers with unsatisfactory or needs improvement
ratings in one of their last two evaluations. They are laid off based on
their performance ratings, with the lowest rated laid off first. The
third group are teachers with satisfactory evaluations. If layoffs
penetrate this group, they are conducted in inverse order of seniority.
The final group is teachers who received ratings of excellent in their
last two or two of their last three evaluations. Teachers in this group
105
are laid off in inverse order of seniority.
The reform law follows the PERA model by requiring each
school district to establish a joint labor-management committee. The
committee may, by majority vote, provide for teachers who would
otherwise be grouped in the second lowest performance classification
to be moved into the next higher classification and may, by majority
vote, modify the criteria for the highest performance grouping.
Members of the committee also serve as watchdogs against school
district manipulation of evaluations to lay off the most senior, and
hence the most highly paid, teachers. If committee members in good
faith believe that there is a pattern where senior faculty are receiving
performance evaluations lower than their prior ones, they may
receive and review relevant data from the district and issue a report
106
to the district and the union.
The 2011, Illinois school reform law also addressed dismissal of
tenured teachers and acquisition of tenure, provisions beyond the
107
scope of this article. However, the approach of the reduction in
force provisions, like the approach in PERA to incorporating student
growth as an element in teacher evaluation plans, bears watching to
see if it develops into a creative alternative to traditional collective
bargaining for providing meaningful worker voice in workplace
decision-making. The joint labor-management committee is designed
104. See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5-24-12(a) (Supp. 2011).
105. Id. § 5/24-12(b).
106. Id. § 5/24-12(c).
107. As indicated earlier, it also made length of the school year and length of the school day
permissive subjects of bargaining for the Chicago Public Schools and modified the bargaining
impasse resolution procedures, most notably restricting the right to strike in the Chicago Public
Schools.
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to work cooperatively on matters of common concern. If it does not
reach agreement or consensus, the result is not a strike or an interest
arbitration or an assertion of power through employer unilateral
implementation followed by challenge to that power via union-filed
unfair labor practice charges. Rather, the result is that the matter is
governed by default rules established by the state.
Proponents of the Illinois education reform law hailed the
process that resulted in its enactment, contrasting it to the highly
108
polarized partisan battles in Wisconsin and elsewhere. As notable as
that process was, the 2011 reform act and PERA may, in the long run,
be even more notable for developing a creative alternative to
traditional collective bargaining for providing meaningful worker
voice in workplace decision-making. If implementation yields positive
result, the model may be examined for adaptation to other groups of
public workers and to adoption in other states.
VI. CONCLUSION
Conservative Republican victories in state elections in 2010
powered a tsunami that hit public sector collective bargaining in 2011,
leaving worker voice in its wreckage and a legacy of unilateral
employer control in its wake. Although supporters of this upheaval
argued that restoration of unilateral employer control was necessary
to improve the functioning of public services, experience tells us that
the approach is likely to fail. As Annie tells us in the play that bears
her name, “The sun will come out tomorrow.” When it does, there
are reasons to be optimistic that policy-makers may move away from
the traditional dichotomy between mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining and unilateral employer control and develop creative
methods for worker voice that empower workers to contribute to the
discourse on how best to serve the public.

108. See Tara Malone, Education Reform Law is Signed and Lauded, CHI. TRIB., June 14,
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